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Abstract 
 
Adagium Si Vis Pacem Para Bellum, which means who wants peace, prepare 
for war. Faced with the dynamics of the global and regional strategic 
environment affecting the defense system that must be prepared by Indonesia. 
China's aggressive action in the Natuna Sea is one proof that defense in the 
Indonesian sea is still a serious concern that must be addressed. The aim of 
this study is to find the best sea defense strategy, to secure the New Capital, 
especially in the sea area. The study was carried out in the sea area which is 
the responsibility of the Makassar Navy Base VI. This study uses George 
Edward III's public policy implementation theory, qualitative descriptive is 
the method used with the phenomenological approach. The results of this 
study show that the implementation of the transmission subfactor, 
communication is only limited to the internal communication of each law 
enforcement entity, there is no integrated operational-tactical operational 
nature. The implementation of the communication clarity sub-factor between 
law enforcement entities is also not yet optimal, due to the limited facilities 
and other facilities, especially related to the problem of operational-tactical 
communication equipment. While the implementation of the communication 
consistency subfactor, the existence of regulations on each entity as the 
operational basis at sea, makes the bureaucratic procedures ineffective and 
inefficient. In conclusion, the communication factor between law 
enforcement entities must be a priority, so that performance can be optimally 
effective and efficient, integrated hardware, software, and brainware must be 
built. An entity that can act as the main controller that can coordinate all 
entities related to law enforcement at sea, and see the results of research 
related to the entity that has the greatest potential as a controller of sea 
security in the Makassar region, the researchers recommend the Navy as the 
Command Center. 
 
 
© 2020 Published by Indonesia Defense University 
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INTRODUCTION  
Indonesia has an open sea area. Various 
forms of threats that must be faced 
increasingly diverse. The dynamics of the 
strategic environment at the global, regional 
and domestic levels present a very broad 
spectrum of threats; ranging from threats to 
environmental and resource security, 
maritime security, human security at sea, to 
threats to state sovereignty (Suhirwan & 
Prakoso, 2019a). Moreover, in 
interconnected seas, forms of threat are 
always dynamic and difficult to predict.  
Therefore, the responsibility to guarantee 
stability and security in Indonesian waters 
which is one of the tasks of the Indonesian 
Navy (TNI AL) carries complex challenges. 
TNI AL has a task that is currently 
increasingly prominent, in line with 
government policies to make the maritime 
sector a priority in national development, or 
better known as the vision of building 
Indonesia into a World Maritime Fulcrum 
(Poros Maritim Dunia). The success of TNI 
AL in realizing maritime security in 
Indonesia (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019b), is 
one of the preconditions for the achievement 
of this vision, in the table below is one of the 
challenges in securing the territorial waters 
of Indonesia, namely crime of ship piracies. 
The table below shows data on ship 
robberies around the world. 
Indonesia's struggle to gain international 
recognition as an archipelago has an impact 
on its responsibility to provide the 
Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Path (Alur Laut 
Kepulauan Indonesia or ALKI). This path is 
used by various countries for transportation 
of both ships and aircraft. ALKI is not only 
prepared by Indonesia as a sovereign 
country over an island nation's sea area but 
has a great responsibility to guarantee the 
safety of anyone who uses ALKI. This is not 
so easy to be implemented by Indonesia, 
given the various limitations that are also 
related to the territory of neighboring 
countries that are not yet fully felt safe such 
as ALKI III through the Philippine sea area. 
The philippine sea area is currently still a 
concern of the international community due 
to frequent piracies by hostage of several 
crew members from various countries. The 
signing was followed by a ransom request 
for a very large amount of money. This 
condition makes special attention in 
safeguarding ALKI in Indonesia, especially 
ALKI III. 
According to Government Regulation 
No. 37 of 2002, ALKI mentioned that there 
are 3 (three) ALKIs in Indonesia: 
1. ALKI I includes maritime lanes from the 
South China Sea across the Natuna Sea, 
Karimata Strait, Java Sea, and Sunda 
Strait to the Indian Ocean, and vice versa; 
and for maritime lanes from the 
Singapore Strait through the Natuna Sea 
and vice versa (Sea Path Branch I A). 
2.  ALKI II maritime lanes from the 
Sulawesi Sea crossing the Makassar 
Strait, the Flores Sea, and Lombok Strait 
maritime lanes to the Indian Ocean, and 
vice versa.   
3.  ALKI-III-A maritime lanes from the 
Pacific Ocean crossing the maritime lanes 
of the Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, Banda 
Sea, Ombai Strait, and Sawu Sea. ALKI 
III-A maritime lane itself has 4 branches, 
namely ALKI III. B maritime lane 
Branch: for maritime from the Pacific 
Ocean across the Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, 
Banda Sea, and Leti Strait maritime lanes 
to the Indian Ocean and vice versa; ALKI 
maritime lane Branch III C: for maritime 
lanes from the Pacific Ocean across the 
Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, the Banda Sea to 
the Arafura Sea and vice versa; ALKI 
maritime lane Branch III D: for maritime 
lanes from the Pacific Ocean across the 
Maluku Sea, maritime lanes of the Seram 
Sea, Banda Sea, Ombai Strait, and Sawu 
Sea to the Indian Ocean and vice versa; 
ALKI maritime lane Branch III E: for 
maritime lanes from the Indian Ocean 
across the Savu Sea, Ombai Strait, Banda 
Sea, Seram Sea, and Maluku Sea. 
 
Every ALKI maritime channel has a 
factual and potential threat. The threat must  
be addressed immediately by implementing 
a   sea   defense   strategy.   In   the   current
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Graphic 1. Data on Sea Piracy around the World from 2009 to 2018 
Source: ICC; ICC IMB; Hellenic Maritime News. 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Map of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Path (Alur Laut  
               Kepulauan Indonesia or ALKI) 
Source:   Government Regulation No. 37, 2002 
 
research conducted in ALKI II, especially in 
the territorial waters that are the authority of 
the Naval Main Base VI in Makassar with 
the consideration that the government has 
decided to move the capital to East 
Kalimantan. Henceforth, the current 
research aims to optimize sea defense 
strategies, especially on communication 
factors between law enforcement entities at 
sea carrying out operations in the ALKI II 
region, especially in waters that are under 
the   authority  of  Naval  Main  Base  VI  in  
Makassar. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on the implementation of sea 
defense strategies in the working area of the 
Naval Main Base VI in Makassar uses the 
theory of public policy implementation 
according to George C. Edward III. 
According to George Edward III, four 
factors determine the success of public 
policy implementation, namely 
communication, resources, disposition, and 
bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980). In 
this study, the factor that will be used to 
analyze    the     problem     is     only       the  
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communication factor, with its sub-factors 
are communication transmission, 
communication clarity, and communication 
consistency. The researchers only take one 
factor, namely communication because, 
from previous studies that have been carried 
out by both other people and researchers 
themselves, this communication factor is the 
biggest inhibiting factor that has occurred in 
the effort to implement sea defense 
strategies in each of Indonesia's 
jurisdictional maritime area. 
 
METHODS  
In the study of the implementation of the sea 
defense strategy in the working area of the 
Naval Main Base VI in Makassar, the 
researchers used a qualitative descriptive 
method with a phenomenological approach. 
The phenomenological approach used is 
according to Johann Heinrich Lambert. The 
phenomenological approach intended to be 
used in this research approach is as a basic 
theory of appearance to study empirically 
about the knowledge of sensory sightings 
(Creswell, 1998). 
The researchers collected secondary data 
from various sources and collected primary 
data from well-informed resource persons 
related to the implementation of sea defense 
strategies in Makassar waters, which were 
directly involved. Speakers who were asked 
for their opinions provided information and 
information according to their respective 
experiences based on the phenomena they 
experience. 
Some of the entities involved in this 
research were Marine Police Directorate of 
South Sulawesi Regional Police, Customs 
Office of the Southern Sulawesi, Sea, and 
Coast Guard Unit of Soekarno Hatta Port in 
Makassar and Head of Untia Port in 
Makassar. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Implementation of Communication 
Factors between Law Enforcement 
Entities at Sea 
The communication factor is very important  
in the implementation of the sea defense 
strategy in securing the Makassar waters, 
especially in securing national and 
international interests in using the ALKI II 
maritime lane. The implementation of this 
communication factor guarantees the 
effective implementation of ALKI II 
security if decision-makers know what they 
are going to do (Agustino, 2006).  
In implementing ALKI II, information is 
needed that is known by decision-makers 
which can only be obtained through good 
communication, internal entities involved, 
and between entities that have the same task 
in securing the Makassar waters. A very 
important communication subfactor is 
divided into communication transmission 
subfactors, communication clarity 
subfactors, and communication consistency. 
 
Communication Transmission  
In the implementation of a sea defense 
strategy in the Makassar waters, a good 
channel of communication between law 
enforcement entities will be needed to 
produce a good implementation as well. 
There are often problems between law 
enforcement entities in communication 
distribution, namely misunderstanding 
(miscommunication) due to the many levels 
of bureaucracy between law enforcement 
entities that must be passed in the 
communication process so that what is 
expected in the implementation of the sea 
defense strategy in the Makassar region is 
distorted in the middle of the road. 
The Operational Assistant of Naval Main 
Base VI in Makassar said that the 
transmission of ALKI II surveillance 
communications between Lantamal VI and 
related agencies, in this case, the 
stakeholders at sea were well maintained. 
This is implemented with a joint 
coordination forum in each agency in turn to 
strengthen relations between agencies. 
However, different information was 
obtained by the researchers from informants 
in the Sea and Coast Guard Unit that in 
security operations that are  the area  of their  
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responsibility, it was constrained by 
communication tools. If the security area is 
covered by their cellular network, they can 
easily contact or coordinate with other law 
enforcement entities, but if it is not covered 
by the cellular network, the radio 
communication equipment on their patrol 
boat cannot contact other entities. 
 
Communication Clarity 
The implementation of the sea defense 
strategy in the Makassar waters area related 
to clarity Communication received by state-
level bureaucrats must be clear and not 
confusing between law enforcement entities 
at sea or unambiguous/ambiguous. Speaking 
of which, the Operational Assistant of Naval 
Main Base VI in Makassar said that, the 
clarity of monitoring information between 
Naval Main Base VI with other maritime 
stakeholders is positioned following the 
authority rules stated in the existing laws and 
regulations. For example, the law 
enforcement authority at sea has been 
regulated in a law stating that there are 7 
(seven) law enforcement entities that have 
the authority to enforce the law at sea, 
including TNI AL, Marine Police 
Directorate of Indonesian National Police, 
General Directorate of Maritime 
Transportation of Ministry of 
Transportation, General Directorate of  
Supervision of Marine Resources and 
Fisheries of Ministry of Maritime and 
Fisheries, General Directorate of Customs of 
Ministry of Finance, Indonesian Coast 
Guard dan Task Force 115 on Illegal Fishing 
Eradication. 
 
Communication Consistency  
The implementation of the sea defense 
strategy implemented in Makassar waters 
requires that the commands given in the 
implementation of communication in 
securing the Makassar waters have to be 
consistent and clear to be established or 
implemented. If the order to safeguard 
Makassar's maritime territories is given to 
change frequently, it can confuse 
implementing entities in the field. Speaking 
of which, the Operational Assistant of Naval 
Main Base VI in Makassar related to 
communication consistency between 
maritime law enforcers in the working area 
of Naval Main Base VI in Makassar: The 
consistency of ALKI II supervision between 
Naval Main Base VI and related agencies in 
Sulawesi waters has been going well 
according to the existing legal basis so that 
we always adhere to the laws and regulations 
as paying law to act in the field. 
Based on the research results of the sea 
defense strategy in the Makassar region, 
there are several obstacles in the 
communication factor as stated by Edward 
III relating to the implementation of a policy 
in the communication transmission 
subfactor, namely (Winarno, 1984): 
• The first obstacle, there is a conflict 
between the policy implementing entity 
and the order issued by the policymaker. 
From the Customs informant, it was 
conveyed that there were individuals 
from certain entities who did not fully 
understand the existing regulations so 
that conflicts in the field often occurred. 
Conflicts between entities implementing 
a sea defense strategy such as this will 
result in distortion and direct obstacles in 
policy communication.  
• The second obstacle, there is 
information that is conveyed internally by 
law enforcement entities, and between 
law enforcement entities through layers 
of bureaucratic hierarchy. Distortion of 
communication between law 
enforcement entities can occur due to the 
length of the information chain which can 
result in information bias.  
• The third obstacle, there is the problem 
of capturing information between entities 
is also caused by perceptions and the 
inability of law enforcement entities at 
sea to implement in understanding the 
requirements of a law enforcement 
policy. 
In implementing the sea defense strategy 
in the Makassar waters, some factors 
encourage this uncertainty due to the 
complexity of the policy, the lack of 
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consensus of law enforcement entities 
regarding the objectives of securing the 
Makassar waters, there are problems in 
starting a new policy related to law 
enforcement at sea, and there is a tendency 
to avoid policy accountability. 
From the results of research in Makassar, 
actually at the leadership level among law 
enforcement entities involved in the 
implementation of the sea defense strategy 
in Makassar has been well established, with 
the existence of a communication forum for 
regional leaders. However, it cannot be 
denied that there are persons who have 
certain goals that are spared from the 
leadership's supervision. This can be an 
obstacle considering the vast area of 
Makassar's waters with various constraints 
and limitations of law enforcement. The 
cause of this communication distortion is in 
line with what Winarno said that the more 
layers or implementing actors involved in 
implementing the policy, the more likely the 
obstacles and distortions faced (Winarno, 
2005). This is also the case with the 
implementation of the sea defense strategy 
in the Makassar waters. 
In implementing the sea defense strategy 
it is necessary to manage good 
communication between law enforcement 
entities, it is necessary to establish and 
develop effective communication channels 
internally and externally. The better the 
development of communication channels 
between the entities that are built, the higher 
the probability of the commands in the 
successful implementation of the sea 
defense strategy in the Makassar area is 
continued correctly. 
In the implementation of the sea defense 
strategy in the Makassar waters area, 
information clarity is needed, it is found that 
there is a tendency to obscure the objectives 
of information by individual actors of certain 
entities based on their interests by 
interpreting information based on their 
understanding. So that the implementation 
of the sea defense strategy can be optimal, 
the way to anticipate obscuring such actions 
is by making joint procedures between law 
enforcement entities through clear 
statements about strengthening commitment 
requirements, commitment to objectives, 
eliminating the choice of multiple 
interpretations between law enforcement 
entities, commitment to implement 
procedures with care careful and committed 
reporting mechanisms in detail. 
In the implementation of the sea defense 
strategy, the communication factor is very 
influential on policy acceptance by the target 
group of law enforcement entities, so that the 
quality of communication will influence in 
achieving the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the sea defense strategy. 
Thus, the dissemination of policy content 
through a good communication process will 
affect the implementation of the sea defense 
strategy.  
In this case, the communication media 
used by law enforcement entities, to 
disseminate the contents of the sea defense 
strategy policy to the target group, will be 
very instrumental in securing the Makassar 
waters. 
 
Optimization of Communication Factors 
between Law Enforcement at Sea 
Based on the analysis and discussion of the 
implementation of ALKI II safeguard 
communication factors carried out by the 
Naval main Base VI in Makassar, linked to 
supporting and inhibiting factors as well as 
the current and expected implementation 
conditions, the researcher formulate the  
strategy by building Maritime Command 
Center by positioning Indonesian Naval 
Base in each Indonesian Maritime Territory 
as the Command Center. Maritime 
Command Centre can be seen in Figure 2. 
Based on Figure 2, departing from the 
results of the analysis and discussion of the 
implementation of the sea defense strategy 
currently in the working area Naval Main 
Base VI in Makassar, it can be explained that 
the current condition of the prominent threat 
is related to drug smuggling, especially 
those that are already 
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Figure 2. Maritime Command Center Strategy in Supervision and Control of ALKI 
Source: Authors’ Data 2020 
 
very prevalent, this smuggling entered from 
various sea and land areas. With the 
condition of a very open area of South 
Sulawesi being a region that has a high 
vulnerability. If this is not immediately 
taken concrete steps, likely, other crimes 
will also develop so that strategic steps need 
to be taken to immediately resolve the 
problem of surveillance and control of 
marine areas, especially ALKI II in the 
Naval Main Base VI in Makasar. 
Factual and potential threats that occur in 
Makassar waters that still dominate are 
transnational organized crime (TNOC), 
illegal drug trafficking of seepage from the 
Sebati-Tawau border region of Malaysia, 
some of which is smuggled on the coasts of 
the Western Region of South Sulawesi. 
Besides, the smuggling of used clothing is 
also still common. The findings in this study 
are new patterns found related to drug 
smuggling and used clothing, namely the 
route from Timor Leste. The smuggling 
route from Tawau into Timor Leste, then 
from Timor Leste transported by wooden 
ships to several regions of Indonesia 
including into the waters of Makassar. 
Regarding drugs, one of the informants 
believes that in the Makassar region it is 
possible to have a drug factory, this is 
indicated by the large variety of drug 
products in the Makassar area, the informant 
believes that the drug products in Makassar 
are not only to be circulated in Makassar but 
also to be sent various regions. It can easily 
be followed by news in online media about 
the rampant arrests of drug cases in 
Makassar and other South Sulawesi regions. 
Another problem related to threats 
occurring at sea is the rampant fish bombing 
case, according to an informant from the 
Untia Makassar port head, who is unique 
that many of these actors are underage so 
that they are not continued in legal 
proceedings, they are fostered in the 
Makassar social shelter near the Untia 
Fishing Port Makassar, at one time the 
number was quite large to more than 50 
people. Law enforcement entities at sea 
continue to take action against fish bombers. 
The number is currently decreasing 
considerably, but there are still several cases. 
At present, 6 law enforcers can conduct 
law enforcement patrols at sea operating in 
the Naval Main Base VI in Makassar. Each 
has its operating pattern. Based on the 
analysis and discussion it was revealed that 
in fact, each entity has the same limitations, 
especially human resources and facilities to 
carry out patrols. For example, General 
Directorate of  Supervision of Marine 
Resources and Fisheries of Ministry of 
Conditions expected by the 
Indonesian Navy to become a 
command center within the 
maritime command center in each 
Lantamal area, particularly in the 
supervision and control of the 
ALKI 
The current condition of law 
enforcement at sea is still running 
separately in carrying out the 
pattern of operations 
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Maritime and Fisheries Office in Makassar, 
according to its authority, has the task of 
overseeing the waters in terms of fishing 
outside the district and provincial 
boundaries above 12 nautical miles. But 
only has a small speedboat, which is only 
capable of patrolling along the coast, as well 
as Marine Police, Customs, and Sea and 
Coast Guard Unit.  
Patrol ships that are quite adequate in the 
Makassar area are owned by Naval Main 
Base VI in Makassar, and that too is 
currently being constrained by government 
policy to use B20. This policy is quite an 
obstacle because ships from TNI AL have 
not yet received equipment that can convert 
B20 to become the fuel that can be used for 
operations at sea. Navy ship engines when 
using B20 there must be additional 
equipment so that B20 can be used to operate 
the ship's engine. 
The Makassar waters are very important 
with the existence of the ALKI II shipping 
lane that crosses the Makassar Strait. This 
shipping channel has a strategic role in 
Indonesia. Opportunities for Makassar to 
utilize ALKI II are very potential for 
economic interests. So far, Makassar has 
been seen as a gateway to the economy of 
eastern Indonesia, where trade flows through 
Makassar before entering eastern Indonesia. 
Makassar's current strategic position has 
also become prominent because the 
Government decided to move the Capital 
City to the Kalimantan Region in Penajam 
Regency, East Kalimantan. The closest force 
of TNI AL is Makassar's Naval Main Base 
VI, so the current research is very much 
related to how to optimize the sea defense 
strategy in the Makassar waters which is the 
working area of Makassar's Naval Main 
Base VI. The new Capital Territory is 
directly confronted with ALKI II, where the 
channel is traversed by international 
interests. Vulnerability will arise with 
potential threats that must be anticipated as 
early as possible. 
The current policy of the Indonesian 
Minister of Defense that national defense is 
the responsibility of all layers (universal 
defense), means that the issue of defense is 
not only the responsibility of the military but 
all state entities, and all levels of society 
must share responsibility for maintaining the 
upholding of Indonesia's sovereignty. 
Budget constraints are indeed a major 
obstacle, but because of this reasoning is 
needed, a concept of how each defense 
strategy implemented can be carried out 
effectively and efficiently. With all the 
limitations that exist must be able to find the 
best strategy, especially in securing sea 
areas. 
In this study, the communication factor 
becomes very important, with the hope that 
if the communication factor between law 
enforcers at sea can find the best solution, it 
is hoped that there will be further solutions 
for other factors. Operational synergy is the 
goal expected in the current research by 
promoting communication factors, both in 
terms of communication transmission, 
communication clarity, and communication 
transmission between law enforcement 
entities at sea that support the 
implementation of a reliable sea defense 
strategy. 
Regarding the current national public 
policy, the Omnibus Law is being initiated, 
currently preceded by policies related to the 
economy, namely taxation. One of the 
objectives of this policy is to simplify the 
many overlapping regulations so that they 
become obstacles in economic development. 
The spirit of this regulation can be applied in 
various fields such as law enforcement at 
sea. The existence of authorized entities in 
law enforcement at sea creates obstacles in 
terms of communication because each entity 
has its policy base. 
Research related to the implementation of 
the sea defense strategy carried out in 
Makassar waters can be a model to be 
applied in various territorial waters of 
Indonesia so that Indonesia's sea defense 
becomes stronger. The synergy of law 
enforcement at sea will also have an impact 
on the economy, as a small example that sea 
transportation businesses are often troubled 
by repeated checks by different law 
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enforcement entities, complaints of these 
entrepreneurs must be considered because 
they are very detrimental to business actors. 
They lost a lot of time, whereas they already 
commit with the user regarding the delivery 
time. 
Policies that form the basis of operational 
law enforcement entities at sea, which are 
the main force of the sea defense strategy, on 
the ground are often constraints due to 
overlapping authority in the field. Both law 
enforcement entities and those affected by 
the policy as described above, often sea 
transportation business actors are repeatedly 
examined with different entities. The 
overlapping policy makes ambiguous some 
implementing parties or those affected by 
the policy, this policy ambiguity arises as 
has been stated by Matland (Matland, 1995).  
Following are the basic regulations used 
by each law enforcement entity at sea that 
often overlaps: 
a.  Naval Commander, Commander of State 
Warship, Naval Airbase, Shipmaster of 
the Directorate General of Perla, people 
who are under the command of the 
commander, commanders, officers of the 
Directorate General of Maritime 
Transportation, harbormaster, sea scouts, 
and the captain of the area of the 
Territorial Sea Ordinance and the 
Prohibited Sea Environment (TZMKO 
1939 Staatsblad 1939 No. 442 ) 
b.  Polri officials, certain civil servant 
officials who are given special authority 
by law, Navy, and other investigating 
officials determined by the applicable law 
Law No. 8 of 1981 (Law Number 8, 
1981) concerning the Criminal Procedure 
Code or KUHAP (Article 4, Article 6 
Paragraph 1 and Article 17). 
c.  Navy officers appointed by the 
Commander in Chief as law enforcement 
officers in the field of investigation of 
violations of the provisions of Law No. 
5/83 of Law Number 5 of 1983 (Law 
Number 5/83, 1983) concerning 
Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone 
(Article 14). 
d.  Investigating officials as stipulated in 
Law Number 5/83 of Law Number 9 of 
1985 (Law Number 9, 1985) Concerning 
Fisheries (Article 31 Paragraph 1)  
e.  Related officials, warships, and 
government vessels to carry out law 
enforcement at sea Act Number 17 of 
1985 concerning Ratification of 
UNCLOS 1982 (Article 107, 110, 111 
and 224). 
f.  Police Investigators, certain Civil 
Servants in a department environment 
whose scope of duties and responsibilities 
includes fostering the conservation of 
biological natural resources and 
ecosystems, without reducing the 
authority of the investigator as stipulated 
in Law Number 5/83 of Law Number 5 of 
1990 (Law Number 5, 1990) concerning 
Conservation of Resources Biodiversity 
and Ecosystems (Article 39 Paragraph 2). 
g.  Indonesian National Police officers, 
certain civil servants in the Ministry of 
Health who were granted special 
authority as referred to in Law Number 6 
of 1981 concerning Criminal Procedure 
Code, and Law Number 23 of 1992 
concerning Health (Law Number 23, 
1992) (Article 79). 
h.  Police Officer Investigators, certain Civil 
Servants within the department whose 
scope of duties and responsibilities are in 
the field of shipping, Navy officers to 
conduct criminal investigations in the 
field of shipping Law Number 21 of 1992 
concerning Voyage (Law Number 21, 
1992) (Article 99). 
i.  Indonesian National Police Officers, 
certain Civil Servants in the Department 
whose scope of duties and responsibilities 
include immigration guidance are given 
the authority of investigators vide Law 
Number 6 of 1981 concerning the 
Criminal Procedure Code to investigate 
immigration criminal acts Act Number 9 
of 1992 (Law Number 9, 1992) 
concerning Immigration (Article 47). 
j.  Certain Civil Servants within the 
Directorate   General    of   Customs  and  
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Excise who are given special authority as 
vide investigators of Law Number 6 of 
1981 concerning the Criminal Procedure 
Code to investigate criminal acts of 
customs Act Number 10 of 1995 (Law 
Number 10, 1995) concerning Customs 
(Article 112). 
k.  Indonesian Navy, Department of 
Agriculture, Department of 
Transportation, Department of Finance, 
and Department of Justice following the 
respective authorities of the Republic of 
Indonesia Law Number 6 of 1996 (Law 
Number 6, 1996) concerning Indonesian 
Waters (Article 24 Paragraph 3). 
l.  Investigators according to the applicable 
laws and regulations Act Number 23 of 
1997 concerning the Environment 
(Paragraph 5; see Article 14 Paragraph 1 
of Law Number 5 of 1983) 
m. The Indonesian National Police plays a 
major role in the investigation & 
investigation of all criminal acts, without 
prejudice to the authority of other 
investigators following the applicable 
laws and regulations Law Number 2 of 
2002 concerning the Indonesian National 
Police (Article 14 Paragraph 1)  
n.  Indonesian Armed Force; Law Number 3 
of 2002 concerning State’s Defense 
(Article 14)  
o.  Fisheries Civil Servant Investigators, 
Navy Officers, and Indonesian National 
Police Officials; Law Number 31 of 2004 
concerning Fisheries (Article 73 
Paragraph 1). 
 
It is undeniable that the TNI AL, among 
law enforcement entities at sea, is the entity 
that has the most complete and most ready 
bureaucratic structure if it becomes a 
Command Center for sea surveillance and 
control. So that in the strategy of building a 
Maritime Command Center 2 things become 
significant: 
a. Changed the network that originally used 
the Star Network to become a Wheel 
Network. From the star network picture, 
it can be seen that the current network 
takes a long time and process because 
each law enforcement entity coordinates 
with each other law enforcement entity. 
Meanwhile, if we consider the Wheel 
Network. It will be very effective with the 
Command Center because all the needs 
will be a movement controlled by one 
party. With the hope that there will be no 
overlapping patrol areas and 
effectiveness and efficiency can be 
obtained. From this strategy patrol zoning 
can also be built for supervision and 
control. 
b. At present each entity that has to patrol in 
the context of law enforcement at sea has 
its policy base, so the next step in 
implementing the Maritime Command 
Center strategy is synchronizing policies. 
If this step is considered to take a long 
time and high difficulty can be taken by 
issuing a new policy to support the 
implementation of the Maritime 
Command Center strategy by stating that 
if the existing regulation contradicts the 
new policy, the Navy in the relevant area 
acts as Command Center decides. 
 
The findings of this study which put the 
TNI AL as the Command Center for 
maritime control in optimizing sea defense 
strategies in Makassar waters are in line with 
Ken Booth's (Booth, 1977) theory which 
says in his book entitled “Navies and 
Foreign Policy” that the Navy has a 
universal role which is not owned by other 
law enforcement officers at seas such as 
Marine Police, Customs, Indonesian Coast 
Guard and other entities in carrying out their 
duties, the roles are: 
a. The military role of the Navy. That the 
Navy has a role in upholding the 
sovereignty of a country using its military 
power, from all forms of threats in the sea 
area which becomes its jurisdiction. 
b. Constabulary role of the Navy. That the 
Navy has the authority to enforce the law 
at sea, conduct activities in the context of 
protecting national marine resources and 
wealth, take action to maintain order at 
sea and carry out activities in the 
framework of supporting national 
 Prakoso, Suhirwan, Prihantoro/Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 6 No. 2 (2020) pp.200-211 
 
210 
 
development by carrying out activities 
that contribute to national stability and 
development. 
c. Diplomatic role of the Navy. That the 
Navy can use sea power as a means of 
diplomacy, to support the foreign policy 
of a country's government, and is 
designed to be able to influence the 
country's leadership or decisions of 
several countries in a state of peace or 
hostile situations. 
 
 These three roles cannot be separated 
from the duties of the Navy universally so 
that in the selection and determination of the 
national defense strategy at sea must also be 
able to reflect a strategy to deal with security 
disturbances. National maritime security 
cannot be separated from regional or global 
regional security, because the ALKI 
maritime lanes in the Indonesian seas are 
used for international purposes, such as the 
theory of complex regional security 
presented by Barry Buzan and Ole Waiver in 
“Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security” (2003). 
 
CONCLUSIONS, 
RECOMMENDATION, AND 
LIMITATION  
The implementation of ALKI II security by 
the Naval Main Base IV in Makassar has so 
far been going well. The existence of a 
communication forum between entities is 
still the mainstay to carry out the supervision 
and control of sea areas, especially related to 
ALKI II. Handling threats at sea is still 
dominated by criminal acts both traditional 
such as the use of fish bombs and those that 
are transnational crimes related to drug 
smuggling and Ball Press. Overcoming 
inhibiting factors the implementation of 
ALKI II security by the Indonesian Naval 
Main Base IV in Makassar is an urgent need 
that must be met immediately by the central 
government in cooperation with the relevant 
Regional Governments, in the context of 
preparing the transfer of the New Capital 
City. 
Based on the results of the analysis and 
discussion, the formulation of a strategy to 
guarantee the security of ALKI II and can be 
applied to each ALKI pathway for 
optimization of communication factors in 
this study is by building Maritime Command 
Center by positioning Indonesian Naval 
Base in each Indonesian Maritime Territory 
as the Command Center. Strengthening the 
Maritime Command Center strategy requires 
government policy support as an operational 
basis by synchronizing all existing 
regulations or making new regulations with 
a single strengthening placing the Naval 
Base as a Command Center in each sea area 
that is its responsibility. 
As a recommendation of the current 
research with the momentum of the 
government to implement the omnibus law, 
now is the right time to implement the 
findings of this study, making a law 
enforcement policy at sea to strengthen the 
sea defense strategy by placing the TNI AL 
as Maritime Command Center.  
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